When Uber arrived in Kampala in June 2016, the idea of ordering a car or boda through a phone was still unfamiliar to many Ugandans. Ten years later, ride-hailing is no longer an experiment. It is part of how many people move around the city.
That makes Uber’s exit from Uganda less a story about whether ride-hailing works and more a question of whether the business can make enough money from a market that has clearly embraced it.
The clearest sign of the problem comes from the drivers themselves. A 2026 study of motorcycle-taxi riders in Kampala found that riders using digital platforms earned 12 percent more in gross weekly income than those operating offline. But after platform commissions, mobile-data costs and additional fuel expenses were taken into account, their net income was 7 percent lower.
In other words, the app can help a rider earn more without necessarily leaving them with more money. That tension sits at the centre of Uganda’s ride-hailing business.
Uber told customers it would end its Ugandan operations on September 2, 2026, following a review of its business and investment priorities. The company has not disclosed the financial performance of its Ugandan operation or identified a specific reason for leaving.
That distinction matters. Uber’s departure should not automatically be read as evidence that Uganda’s market is unprofitable. The company operates across many countries, and investment decisions can reflect wider corporate priorities.
What is clear is that the market it helped create has continued to grow. Research by Sagaci found that about 36 percent of people in Kampala used ride-hailing services in 2024, putting Uganda among the more established ride-hailing markets in Africa.
Local competition has also become much stronger. SafeBoda says it has completed more than 50 million rides and has more than 30,000 trained boda and car drivers. Bolt has also built a significant presence, alongside other platforms competing for passengers and drivers.
So Uber is leaving a market that is considerably different from the one it entered a decade ago. The question is what the remaining players can make of it.
Bolt says the median income earned by its Ugandan drivers in December 2025 was Shs359,083 per week. Its commission in Uganda is 20 percent of the final order price, although the company notes that earnings vary depending on the number and type of trips completed.
For drivers, however, the money coming through the app is only the beginning of the calculation.
There is fuel to pay for. There is maintenance. There is mobile data. There are platform commissions. And for many motorcycle riders, there are other costs associated with keeping the bike on the road.
This is why the difference between gross and net income matters. A platform can increase the number of trips a driver gets without necessarily improving what the driver takes home.
That creates a difficult balancing act. Passengers want low fares. Drivers want higher earnings. Platforms need enough trips and enough commission revenue to cover the cost of operating the service. Push fares too high and passengers can return to traditional transport. Push commissions too high and drivers may leave the platform. Keep prices too low and the economics become difficult for everyone.
Uganda has seen this tension before. In 2017, less than a year after Uber launched in Kampala, drivers protested against fare reductions. Uber had cut its base fare from Shs1,300 to Shs1,100, the per-kilometre rate from Shs900 to Shs750, and the minimum fare from Shs5,000 to Shs3,000.
Drivers argued that the new rates made it harder to earn a viable income. Nearly a decade later, the basic argument remains familiar: how much of every ride should go to the passenger, the driver and the platform?
There is another reason the economics of ride-hailing in Uganda are complicated. The platforms are not competing only with each other. They are competing with a transport system that existed long before the apps.
A passenger can still walk to the roadside and negotiate directly with a boda rider. No app is required. No platform commission is deducted from the fare. The transaction is immediate.
That gives traditional transport an advantage that technology cannot simply eliminate.
Smartphone access also puts a ceiling on the addressable market. Daily Monitor, citing Uganda Communications Commission figures, has reported smartphone access at about 18 million people, in a country of roughly 50 million.
Ride-hailing may be increasingly common in Kampala, but it is not yet a universal transport system.
Uber’s departure will create an opening for competitors. SafeBoda and Bolt can compete for Uber’s former passengers and drivers. But capturing that market is only one part of the challenge. The bigger question is whether they can do it profitably.
For passengers, the disappearance of one major platform could mean more choice in the short term as competitors fight for market share. For drivers, it could mean more opportunities to find trips.
But neither necessarily solves the underlying problem. If fares remain low, drivers may struggle to make enough after expenses. If fares rise, passengers may find alternatives. If commissions are reduced, platforms have less revenue to support their operations.
That is the uncomfortable economics of ride-hailing. The industry has already won the adoption battle. Ugandans do not need much convincing that an app can help them find a ride.
The harder battle is turning that demand into a sustainable business. Uber’s decade in Uganda has shown that building a customer base is possible. What remains harder is making the numbers work for everyone involved.
In Uganda, the next contest is no longer primarily about adoption. It is about economics: who can turn established demand into a model that works for passengers, drivers and the platform.
